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Abstract
Dynamic models for credit rating transitions are important ingre-
dients for dynamic credit risk analyses. We compare the properties
of two such models that have recently been put forward. The models
mainly differ in their treatment of systematic risk, which can be mod-
eled either using discrete states (e.g., expansion versus recession) or
continous states. It turns out that the implied asset correlations for
discrete state switching models are implausibly low compared to corre-
lation estimates in the literature. Given these limited correlations, we
conclude that care has to be taken when discrete state regime switch-
ing models are employed for dynamic credit risk management. As a
side result of our analysis, we obtain indirect evidence that default
correlations may change over the business cycle.
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1 Introduction
Credit risk management has evolved considerably over the past decade. Ear-
lier work in the area was characterized by a dominant focus on credit scoring
and static assessment of default probabilities, see for example Caouette, Alt-
man, and Narayanan (1998). Though the evaluation of a counterparty’s
creditworthiness at the loan contracting stage is still very important, the
increased number (and liquidity) of instruments and markets for credit risk
has required a more dynamic approach to credit risk management. Trad-
ing derivatives on credit risky instruments, for example, requires dynamic
hedging decisions. Also the possibility to securitize part of a bond or loan
portfolio at flexible points in time provides banks with much more options for
their credit risk management process. To evaluate the alternative options,
models are needed to describe the evolution of key credit risk drivers such as
default and credit rating migration probabilities, as well as recovery rates.
In this paper we concentrate on alternative model specifications that have
been introduced for credit rating migrations. A credit rating summarizes
the creditworthiness of the underlying firm. Credit rating transitions may
vary with ecomic conditions. For example, following the empirical evidence
in Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto (2000) and Bangia, Diebold, Kronimus,
Schagen, and Schuermann (2002), defaults and downgrades are more likely
during recessions than during expansions. Time variation in transition prob-
abilities, especially if correlated with economic conditions, may have an im-
portant impact. Under risk sensitive capital requirements as proposed in the
new Basle Capital Accord (Basle Committee on Bank Supervision (2003)),
capital buffers would have to be raised significantly if an expansion turns
into a recession, see the numerical experiments in Bangia et al. (2002).
We distinguish two types of models in the literature for linking rating
transition probabilities to economic conditions. They differ in their treat-
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ment of the state of the economy. Nickell et al. (2000) and Bangia et al.
(2002) use discrete states. Bangia et al. (2002) for example use a panel data
set on rating migrations and divide their sample into recession and expan-
sion quarters.1 Next, they estimate separate probabilities for each regime.
This approach is intuitively appealing and yields plausible results for the
transition probabilities. However, the question remains whether the limited
number of discrete states provides a rich enough characterization of portfolio
credit risk. An alternative approach is to model the state of the economy as
a continuous variable. This can be done using observed components as in for
example Wilson (1997a,b) or Kavvathas (2001), Das, Freed, Geng, and Kapa-
dia (2002), or unobserved components, see for example Jarrow and Turnbull
(1995), Duffie and Singleton (1999), Finger (2000), or Koopman, Lucas, and
Klaassen (2002). See also the overview paper of Allen and Saunders (2003).
To answer the question whether the discrete or continuous state modeling
approach is more useful, we conduct a numerical experiment in the current
paper. In particular we address the question whether discrete state mod-
els provide a sufficiently rich description of credit risk outcomes compared to
typical models with continuous states. We do so by matching the empirically
implied credit loss distribution of Bangia et al. (2002) to that of a standard
one-factor credit loss model with continuous states. This can be achieved by
varying the default probability and the likelihood of joint defaults in the fac-
tor model. The implied numerical default probabilities and asset correlations
can subsequently be assessed with respect to their plausibility. We have the
following main findings. First, the discrete state model has a low likelihood
of joint defaults as measured through the implied asset correlations. These
range from around 2% down to 0.5%. In all cases, these figures are signif-
icantly below prescribed regulatory asset correlations, see Basle Committee
on Bank Supervision (2003). They are also far below usual correlations (R2)
1Nickell et al. (2000) also distinguish a middle regime.
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of around 20% in typical market model regressions, which is the relevant
comparison, see for example Lucas, Klaassen, Spreij, and Straetmans (2001).
Second, we find that asset correlations are higher conditional on the economy
starting in a recession vis-a`-vis an expansion. This corroborates recent find-
ings by Das et al. (2002) using a different approach and data set. Deng et al.
use model-based measures of individual default intensities using market and
accounting data to estimate intensity correlations. By contrast, we use direct
aggregate information on default and rating migrations. We conclude that
care has to be taken when applying the current generation of regime switch-
ing credit risk models for capital allocation. On the one hand, a dichotomy in
default regimes is intuitively appealing. One has to make sure, however, that
the model induced range of annual credit losses has suffient breadth to reflect
the actual risk in well-diversified credit portfolios, i.e., correlations must be
sufficiently high. On the other hand, standard models with continuous state
variables for the economy and constant asset correlations may be misspecified
in that they do not acknowledge an increase in default correlations during
recessions. This feature is better taken up by the proposed discrete state
switching models.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the model,
the experimental set-up, and the main results. The final section concludes.
2 Modeling framework
Our basic framework is given by the Gaussian one-factor model for credit risk,
see Gupton, Finger, and Bhatia (1997) and Gordy (2003). For completeness,
we summarize the main model aspects we use in our analysis. We assume
that the default event for firm j is driven by a latent variable Sj. The default
risk driver Sj can be decomposed as
Sj = ρf +
√
1− ρ2εj, (1)
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where f and εj are the systematic and firm-specific risk, respectively. Fol-
lowing Basle Committee on Bank Supervision (2003) and Gupton, Finger,
and Bhatia (1997), f and εj are assumed independent and standard normal.
The coefficient ρ determines the relative weight of each of these risk factors
in the default process. In a structural modeling setting of Merton (1974),
the variable Sj can be interpreted as the firm’s equity value. In our current
static set-up, however, this interpretation is not exclusive, and one might also
give a reduced form interpretation to (1) as in Jarrow and Turnbull (1995)
or Duffie and Singleton (1999). In a structural interpretation, however, note
that the correlation between Sj and Sk for k not equal to j equals ρ
2. We
therefore refer to ρ2 as the asset correlation parameter. The higher ρ2, the
higher the likelihood of defaults occuring in clusters.
Using (1), we can model the default frequency in a straightforward way.
Let 1A denote the indicator function of the set A, then the default frequency
pn in a portfolio of n counterparties can be defined as
qn =
1
n
n∑
j=1
1{Sj<c}, (2)
where c denotes the default boundary. We now take a large portfolio approx-
imation to credit losses as in Lucas, Klaassen, Spreij, and Straetmans (2001).
This approximation is reasonable as long as the portfolio size is sufficiently
large (n > 200).2 We have
q = q(f) = lim
n→∞
qn
a.s.
= P [Sj < c| f ] = Φ
(
c− ρf√
1− ρ2
)
, (3)
with Φ denoting the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf).
From (3) and the normality assumption for f , we can easily obtain the dis-
tribution of default frequencies. In particular, Φ−1(q) is normally distributed
2Note that the granularity condition of Gordy (2003) is automatically satisfied here, as
we consider default frequencies rather than losses.
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with mean c/
√
1− ρ2 and variance ρ2/(1 − ρ2). Alternatively, if µ and σ2
denote the mean and variance of Φ−1(q), respectively, then
ρ2 = σ2/(1 + σ2),
c = µ/
√
1 + σ2.
(4)
In our current analysis, we link model (1) based on a continuous state
variable for current economic conditions to a model that uses discrete states.
We focus on the model of Bangia et al. (2002). The main reason for this
is that Bangia et al. not only provide estimates of transition matrices over
different stages of the business cycle, but also a model for switches from one
economic regime to the other. The framework of Bangia et al. builds upon
the existence of two quarterly transition matrices T r and T e, applicable in
recessions and expansions, respectively. The (i, j)th element T rij, for example,
gives the probability that a firm with initial rating i migrates to rating j over
the next quarter, given that the next quarter will be a recession. The rating
category with the highest index j denotes the absorbing default state. To
distinguish recessions from expansions, NBER classifications are used. To
select the appropriate regime for a specific quarter, Bangia et al. estimate
a simple regime switching model characterized by the transition matrices
given in the note to Table 1 later on. Note that the intuition underlying this
approach bears strong resemblance to (1) and (3). The main difference is
that over a 4 quarter horizon, we only have 16 possible sequences of recessions
and expansions, i.e., of the systematic risk factor, whereas the systematic risk
factor f in (3) takes continuous values. Both approaches, however, provide
default frequencies contingent on the state of the economy.
It is difficult to compare the approach of Bangia et al. and (1) directly.
To facilitate the comparison, we use relation (3) to cast the regime switching
model into a one-factor structure. Note that for every sequence of (quarterly)
recessions and expansions we obtain a conditional (on that sequence) default
probability for a specific rating grade. For example, the last element of the
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top row of (T r)4 indicates the one-year default probability of an AAA firm
over the next year, given that the next year only has recession quarters. Sim-
ilarly, the last element of the second row of (T e)4 gives the one-year default
probability of an AA rated firm, given that the next year only has expansion
quarters. The probability of 4 recession (or expansion) quarters in a row
directly follows from the regime switching model for the macro-economy, see
Bangia et al. (2002) and Table 1. This probability may be either uncondi-
tional or conditional, i.e., conditional on the current quarter being a recession
or expansion. The Bangia et al. approach thus produces 16 pairs (q(f˜), p(f˜)),
where f˜ denotes the sequence of four recession or expansion quarters, p(f˜)
denotes the probability of that sequence, and q(f˜) the conditional (on f˜)
default probability. Given these 16 pairs we can use (4) to obtain maximum
likelihood3 estimates of the unconditional default probability p = Φ(c) and
the asset correlation ρ2. I.e., we use the conditional default frequencies and
corresponding regime probabilities to calibrate the unknown parameters in
(3). This amounts to approximating the sequences’ distribution p(f˜) by a
transformed normal distribution, see Figure 1 for an example. We do so
for different rating classes, different conditioning sets, and the two different
regime switching models in Bangia et al. (2002). The results are in Table 1.
Table 1 reveals several interesting patterns. First we note the familiar
increase in default probabilities p if the rating declines. Also, the one year
default probabilities are higher if we start from a current recession vis-a`-
vis an expansion. This has also been documented in Nickell et al. (2000)
and Bangia et al. (2002). Second, we find that asset correlations ρ2 are
uniformly low across ratings and sample periods. They range from 2.18%
3More specifically, given our large-portfolio approximation, the estimates are obtained
using asymptotic maximum likelihood maximization or Kullback-Leibler distance mini-
mization. As a robustness check, we also used a simulation approach to estimate implied
correlations accounting for both systematic and idiosyncratic risk. The results were the
same as reported here.
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Table 1:
Implied asset correlations and default probabilities
for the Bangia et al. model
Rating AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC
Switching Model on 1959–1998
Unconditional
p 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.90 4.76 30.46
ρ2 1.29 0.79 0.90 2.04 1.36 0.96 1.18
Conditional: current expansion
p 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.87 4.68 30.12
ρ2 1.06 0.64 0.87 1.95 1.27 0.88 1.07
Conditional: current recession
p 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.99 5.08 31.75
ρ2 1.95 1.16 1.01 2.18 1.55 1.12 1.43
Switching Model on 1981–1998
Unconditional
p 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.86 4.63 29.98
ρ2 0.91 0.61 0.74 1.71 1.10 0.75 0.91
Conditional: current expansion
p 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.85 4.60 29.83
ρ2 0.82 0.55 0.73 1.68 1.06 0.72 0.87
Conditional: current recession
p 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.91 4.80 30.67
ρ2 1.25 0.86 0.79 1.83 1.22 0.85 1.06
Using the Gaussian one-factor (or CreditMetrics) model for credit risk, see Gup-
ton et al. (1997) and Gordy (2003), we calibrate the unconditional default prob-
ability p and ‘asset correlation’ ρ2 to match the distribution of one-year default
frequencies implied by the regime switching approach of Bangia et al. (2002).
Figures are given as percentages. Calibrations are carried out for different initial
ratings. The quarterly rating transition matrices applicable in expansions (T e)
and recessions (T r) can be found in Bangia et al. (2002). The economic regime
follows a quarterly two-state Markov chain (expansion/recession) characterized
by
(
0.848 0.152
0.575 0.425
)
based on 1959–1998 data (where 0.575 is the probability
of switching from a recession to an expansion), and
(
0.850 0.150
0.692 0.308
)
based on
1981–1998 data. Unconditional means that the first quarter’s state is drawn from
the unconditional or stationary distribution. The conditional entries indicate that
the current economic state is an expansion or recession, respectively.
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Figure 1: Bangia et al. and approximating normal distribution of conditional
default rates for BBB rating
Given the quarterly recession/expansion regime switching model of Bangia et al. (2002)
we obtain 16 different economic states (f˜) with conditional default probabilities q(f˜) in
each state. The cdf of q(f˜) following from the Bangia et al. model provide the solid p(f˜)
curve in the figure. The cdf is computed for a BBB rating with the first quarter’s regime
drawn from the unconditional distribution. Using (4), the default threshold c and asset
correlation ρ2 are estimated to approximate Φ−1(q(f˜)) by a normal distribution. The
resulting approximation Φ((c−
√
1− ρ2Φ−1(q(f˜)))/ρ) is depicted by the dashed curve.
for BBB rated firms that start in a recession (59–98 sample), to 0.55% for
AA rated firms that start in expansions (81–98 sample). A clear pattern in
the size of correlations across rating grades is lacking. In all cases, however,
correlations appear substantially below the asset correlations put forward
in the new Basle proposals. The correlations also appear low if they are
interpreted as true asset correlations. For example, typical asset correlations
for US stocks have their mode between 15% and 25%, see Lucas et al. (2001).
Taken together, this leads to the conclusion that care has to be taken if
discrete state regime switching models are employed for dynamic credit risk
management and capital requirements. The effective spread in outcomes of
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such models may be insufficient to adequately reflect the macro-economic
risk at a portfolio level. To overcome these potential hazards, one might
look for a finer distinction between different economic regimes. Alternatively,
common risk factors might be captured using continuous rather than discrete
state variables. A third finding from Table 1 is that the sample period for
estimating the macro-economic risk dynamics has important consequences
for parameter estimates. Using the longer sample period, we see that the
estimated correlations are uniformly higher. This is an important finding
given that many recent research on rating migrations concentrates on the
shorter time horizon because of data availability. If such data are used, asset
and default correlations between obligors might be underestimated due to
limited variability in the macro-system over the period chosen. A fourth and
final interesting feature emerging from Table 1 is that correlations appear
higher in recessions than expansions. This closely follows the findings on
default correlations in Das et al. (2002). Though their modeling framework
and data used is entirely different, they also report that during economic
downswings, default correlations are higher as firms are more likely to be
pushed into default (simultaneously) due to economy-wide risk factors. In
upswings, by contrast, rating movements are much more firm-specific and
contain less common factors. This is corroborated by the computations based
on the direct aggregate default and rating migration data underlying Table 1.
3 Conclusion
In this paper we have used a simple mapping to cast discrete state regime
switching models for credit risk into a continuous state factor model struc-
ture. We used this approach to study the implied default probabilities and
asset correlations of the regime switching approach of Bangia et al. (2002).
We found that correlations implied by the model are low, and may appear
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too low given typical estimates of asset correlations in the literature. This
cautions the use of these models for credit risk management and capital de-
termination. A careful inspection is needed to guarantee that the spread in
economic outcomes of a regime switching model adequately captures the true
credit risk at a portfolio level. Our results also showed that correlations esti-
mated using the past twenty years of data are uniformly lower than estimates
based on a longer time span of 40 years or more. Again, this raises questions
as to the robustness of empirical analyses based on data commonly starting
in the early 80s. Finally, using our framework and data we corroborated
the findings of Das et al. (2002): asset and default correlations appear to
be higher in recessions than in expansions. This is to some extent captured
by the regime switching approach, but not by the standard continuous state
models with constant correlations. The latter should therefore be augmented
to include state variation in correlations as well.
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